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Buzhardt: Statutory Construction

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
J. FRED BUZHARDT, JR.*

Few cases of general interest involving statutory construction were decided during the period of this survey. The cases
included are of interest not because of any change or trend in
the applicable rules, but because of the novelty of the situations in which the established rules were applied.
The automobile attachment lien statute1 was construed in
Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. S. C. Electric & Gas Co.2 The case
turned on whether a trailer being drawn by a truck-tractor
on a highway was included in the term "motor vehicle," as
used in the attachment statute. The Court, in deciding in the
affirmative, held that a definition of a "motor vehicle" in
an unrelated statute was not controlling as to the meaning of
the term in the attachment statute and it was immaterial
whether this particular type of vehicle was in existence at
the time of enactment of the statute.
In at least one case the Court re-emphasized the rule that
repeals by implication are not favored. In City of Spartanburg v. Blalock,3 the Court was faced with a controversy between the city council and the Commissioners of Public Works
as to who had the authority to fix rates, etc., for the waterworks system. The two statutes involved were an act 4 passed
in 1896 enabling municipalities to construct and operate waterworks and to elect commissioners to manage them, and an
act5 passed in 1933, authorizing municipalities to issue revenue
bonds for construction and improvement of waterworks and
providing for the governing body of the borrower to fix the
rates, etc., for the waterworks. The Court, by examining the
history of the period in which the 1933 act, supra, was passed,
determined that the intention of the legislature was to enable
municipalities to qualify for federal grants in a period of
economic crisis, rather than to deprive previously established
managerial bodies of their powers. Having determined this
*Member of the firm of Buzhardt & Buzhardt, McCormick, S. C.; LL.B.,
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1. CoDE OF LAWS OF SouTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 45-551.
2. 223 S.C. 320, 75 S.E. 2d 288 (1958).
3. 223 S.C. 252, 75 S.E. 2d 360 (1958).
4. Act March 2, 1896, § 1 et seq., 22 ST. AT LARGE, p. 83, as amended.
5. Act May 8, 1933, § 1 et seq., 38 ST. AT LARGE, p. 411, as amended.
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legislative intent, the Court held that the council's authority
was supervisory and it could interfere only when the Commissioners of Public Works, by the establishment of rates or
policies, failed to comply with the requirements of the act of
1933, supra.
That changes in phraseology incident to revision of the
code will not be construed as altering the law, unless such an
intention by the legislature is clearly expressed, was determined in Town of ForestAcres v. Seigler8 The question which
occasioned this holding was whether a municipality could annex a part of another municipality without submitting the
question of detachment to the voters of the municipality that
would be reduced. After having held that such an annexation
would be invalid under provisions of the 1942 Code, 7 the Court
turned to the changes made in the 1952 version of the statute.8
The clause in question read, in the 1942 Code, "whether the
said adjacent territory be in whole or in part in incorporated
municipality" and in the revised version read, "whether the
said adjacent territory be in whole or in part in an incorporated municipality."' 0 (Italics ours.) The Court, in determining the meaning of the statute turned to the original act,
which read, "whether the said adjacent territory be in whole
or in part an incorporated municipality,"' ' (Italics ours) and
concluded that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained from the wording of the original act because of the
ambiguity which existed in the revised statutes. 1 2 As a result,
both the 1942 and 1952 versions of the statute were declared
to have the same effect, despite their apparent conflict, and
the attempted annexation was invalid.
A zoning ordinance was construed in Purdy v. Moise.13 Applying the rule that a statute or ordinance in derogation of
material rights should be strictly construed, the Court held
that a zoning ordinance which authorized the construction
of a hotel in the zone in question did not exclude a tourist
or motor court.
6. 224 S.C. 166, 77 S.E. 2d 900 (1953).
7. See S. C. CODE OF LAWS, 1942 §§ 7320-7332.

8.

CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

9. S. C. CODE OF LAWS, 1942

§ 7231.

1952 § 47-13.

10. CODE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 47-13.
11. 27 ST. AT LARGE, p. 22 (1911).
12. S. C. CODE OF LAWS, 1942 § 7231; CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 47-13.

13. 223 S.C. 298, 75 S.E. 2d 605 (1953).
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Two of the statutes 4 struck down by the Court as unconstitutional are of interest, although neither was of state-wide
application. In Fordham v. Fordham,15 the Court held that
the provision 6 of the Juvenile and Domestic-Relations Courts
Act, 17 which gives the family court jurisdiction over a husband who "is not residing or domiciled in the county but is
found therein at such time and the petitioner is so residing
or domiciled at such time," is unconstitutional because such
provision is a special law in a field where a general law is
applicable and thereby deprives a defendant of his substantial right to be tried in the county of his residence.
An over-zealous attempt to promote the lot of the fairer
sex caused an election of a school board to be declared invalid
and the statute 8 authorizing the election to be held unconstitutional. The validity of the election was before the Court
in Lee v. Clerk.'9 The act provided that the three women candidates who received the largest vote of the women candidates
should be elected, regardless of whether they were among the
nine candidates receiving the largest number of votes. This
provision was held to discriminate against male candidates
and, therefore, was unconstitutional. The Court held further
that this discriminatory provision was not separable from the
remainder of the statute as the legislature would not have
passed the remaining provisions in the absence of the discriminatory part and, therefore, the entire act unconstitutional.
In the State Ex Rel. Callison v. National Linen Service Corporation,20 the Court considered the "Anti Trust Statute" 2'
and applying the rule that a statutory provision which works
a forfeiture requires strict construction and held that a corporation and its employees or two employees of the same corporation could not constitute the required "two or more" necessary to form a conspiracy contemplated by the statute.
A retail liquor dealer was held ineligible for a refund under
the refund provisions 2 2 of the alcohol stamp tax law in the
14. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 15-1233(2), and Act
of March 22, 1952, 47 STAT. AT LARGE, p. 2111.
15. 223 S.C. 401, 76 S.E. 2d 299 (1953).
16. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 15-1233 (2).
17. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, Chap. 7, Vol. 2.

18. Act March 22, 1952, 47 ST. AT LARGE, p. 2111.

19. 224 S.C. 138, 77 S.E. 2d 485 (1953).
20. 81 S.E. 2d 342 (S.C. 1954).
21. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 66-51.
22. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTt CAROLINA, 1952 § 65-1268.
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case of Asmer v. Livingston.23 The Court refuted the contention that this provision should be strictly construed against
the state as a revenue act and ruled that a refund of taxes
is a matter of governmental grace so that one seeking a refund
must bring himself clearly within the terms of the statute.
The Court then held that the "licensee" authorized to receive
a refund by the statute referred only to a licensed wholesaler
and did not include E&retailer.

23. 82 S.E. 2d 465 (S.C. 1954).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol7/iss1/23

4

